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The 90-day DTF rate is the main benchmark interest rate in Colombia.  Since mid-July 
2002 this rate has remained more or less constant at around 7.8 percent.  More 
importantly, it did not react to any of two 100-basis-point increases in the overnight repo 
rate, the main tool of monetary policy that Banco de la República has to influence 
domestic interest rates, which has rendered the repo rate rather inefficient as a monetary 
policy tool.  This paper studies the DTF rate and its development over time.  It shows that 
a significant pass-through from the overnight interest rates to the DTF rate that was 
present before July 2002 thereafter seems to have vanished.  It also provides a number of 
explanations to why the DTF rate has remained constant: Overnight rates have in real 
terms been negative and might, therefore, have been more out of the market than the DTF 
rate; due to heavy government borrowing,  the yield curve has been too steep to allow a 
further lowering of the DTF rate; competition in the financial system is low, leading to 
sticky interest rates; the DTF rate is not a free-market auction rate but an offer rate set by 
the banks; and the DTF rate is a very dominant benchmark. 
 
                                                  
* The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily of the Banco de la República, the 
Colombian Central Bank, nor of its Board of Directors.   I express my thanks to Franz Hamann, Munir Jalil, 
Ana Fernanda Maihuasca, and Juan Mauricio Ramírez  for helpful comments and suggestions.  Any 
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1   Introduction 
 
The 90-day DTF
1 interest rate is the most important benchmark rate in Colombia.  This is 
an interest rate composite, calculated as the weighted average of the interest rates on 90-
day Certificates of Deposits (CDs)2 offered by Colombian banks and financial 
institutions. 
 
Up until July 2002, the DTF rate responded consistently to changes in the overnight repo 
rate, which is the main monetary policy tool with which Banco de la República can 
influence the domestic interest rates and, therefore, also the domestic yield curve.
3 
 
However, since mid-July 2002, the DTF rate has remained more or less constant at 
around 7.8 percent, even if the overnight repo rate has been changed significantly at 
several points in time.  The pass-through from the overnight rate to the DTF rate, which 
was present before July 2002, seems to have disappeared.  This is highly unsatisfactory, 
since it has made the repo rate as a monetary policy tool rather inefficient. 
 
This paper aims to explain why the DTF rate has remained constant after July 2002 and 
why it has not responded to the changes in the overnight repo rate.  A number of possible 
explanations can be envisaged, and the paper concludes that several such explanations 
play important parts.  From May 2002, over-night interest rates were, in real terms, 
negative, and might, therefore, have been more out of line with the market than the DTF 
rate, which in real terms remained positive.  A steep yield curve, moreover, hindered a 
further lowering of the DTF rate.  Structural factors also play important parts, such as the 
low competition within the banking system, the fact that the 90-day CD  rates that 
underlie the DTF rate are not auction rates but deposit rates offered by the banks, and that 
the DTF rate is a very dominant benchmark. 
                                                  
1 Depósitos Termino Fijo, i.e. fixed term deposits. 
2 We will throughout this paper assume that CDs has an interest rate that is fixed throughout their maturity.  
Such CDs are in Colombia generally referred to as CDTs. 
3 The banks started using the overnight repo rate as an active monetary policy tool in 1998, when inflation 
targeting started.   4 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the different Colombian interest 
rates and their development over time.  Interest-rate pass-through is also analysed in this 
chapter.  Chapter 3 discusses how and why the banks might keep the DTF rate constant.  
Other factors that might make the DTF rate sticky are discussed in chapter 4, and chapter 
5 concludes the paper. 
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2   Colombian Interest Rates 
 
In this chapter we look at the DTF rate in relation to some other interest rates in 
Colombia.  Section 2.1 defines the DFT rate and discusses its development over time, and 
in particular how it has responded to changes in the overnight repo rate.  Section 2.2 
discusses the overnight inter-bank rate and CD rates of longer maturities than the DTF 
rate.  In section 2.3 the pass-through between the overnight rate and the DTF rate is 
analysed.  Section 2.4 discusses the real interest rate, section 2.5 the implicit forward rate, 




2.1   The DTF Interest Rate 
 
The 90-day DTF interest rate is the most important benchmark rate in Colombia.  It is 
calculated weekly  as a weighted average of the interest rates on 90-day Certificates of 
Deposits (CDs) issued by banks and other financial institutions to their clients. 
 
As illustrated by figure 2.1, the DTF rate responded relatively consistently to changes in 
the overnight repo rate up until July 2002.  The repo rate is the main monetary policy tool 
with which Banco de la República has influenced the domestic interest rates and, 
therefore, also the domestic yield curve. 
 
However, from 22 July 2002 and onwards, the DTF rate h as remained more or less 
constant  at  around 7.8 percent, even if the overnight repo rate has been changed 
significantly at several points in time.  The repo rate was, in fact, raised by 100 basis 
points in January 2003 and by a further 100 basis points in May 2003.  There was no 
significant reaction in the DTF rate to these relatively large changes in the repo rate.  This 
is unsatisfactory, since it has rendered the repo rate inefficient as a monetary policy tool.  
Figure 2.2 shows the development of the DTF rate and the repo rate after July 2002.   6 
Figure 2.1.  The DTF rate and the repo rate, 1999-2004 (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  The DTF rate and the repo rate, 2002-2004 (%) 
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In February 2004, the repo rate was lowered by 25 basis points, and in March it was 
lowered by a further 25 basis points.  The DTF rate did indeed react to the first of these 
two decreases.  The five-week average of the DTF rate fell from 7.96 percent just before 
the change in the repo rate to 7.71 percent just after, which represents quite exactly a 
decrease of 25 basis points.
4  The DTF rate did, however, not react to the second decrease 
in the repo rate.  The five-week average of the DTF rate, in fact, rose from 7.71 percent 
just before the decrease in the repo rate to 7.77 percent just after.  This rise is, however, 
not significant at the 5-percent level. 
 
We will in section 2.3 analyse the interest-rate pass-through from the repo rate to the 
DTF rate.  However, first we take a look at some of the other interest rates in the 




2.2   Some Different Interest Rates over Time 
 
At the short end of the yield curve, in addition to the overnight repo rate, we also have the 
overnight inter-bank interest rate ( tasa de interés interbancaria, TIB).  As shown by 
figure 2.3, the TIB has closely followed the repo rate, and any change in the latter has 
directly generated a corresponding change in the former.  So there is an apparent transfer 
mechanism between the repo rate and the TIB, while such a mechanism seems to be 
absent from the overnight rates to the 90-day DTF rate. 
 
                                                  
4 This change in the DTF rate is significant at the 1-percent level.  Note also that in the dataset for the DTF 
rate, the data point for 8 March 2004 has been adjusted for the fact that one bank issued a large number of 
90-day CDs at an interest rate significantly above the rate of other banks, and this bank has in the dataset 
used here been excluded from the DTF composite, but only for this specific point in time.  For the rest of 
the time series, the unadjusted DTF rate has been used, as published by Banco de la República.   8 
Figure 2.3.  The repo rate, the TIB and the DTF rate, 2002-2004 (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
 
 
If we study longer maturities, benchmark rates exist for 180 days and 360 days.  The 
CDT 180 and the CDT 360 are both interest rate composites derived from certificate-of-
deposit rates.  As in the case of the DTF rate, none of these are auction rates, but rather 
deposit rates offered by the banks to their clients.  They, therefore, suffer from some of 
the same shortcomings as the DTF composite.  Figure 2.4 graphs the development over 
time of the DTF rate, the CDT 180 rate and the CDT 360 rate.  It is obvious from the 
figure, that there has not been any apparent shift neither in the DTF rate nor in the CDT 
180 rate in response to the changes in the repo rate.  The CDT 360 rate is much more 
volatile due to the small volumes of 360-day CDs issued by the banks, so this rate is less 
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Figure 2.4.  The repo rate, the DTF rate, the CDT 180 and the CDT 360, 2002-2004 (%) 
 




2.3   Interest Rate Pass-Through 
 
By studying figure 2.1 earlier, we concluded that before July 2002 the DTF rate 
responded relatively consistently to changes in the overnight repo rate, while after July 
2002, changes in the repo rate did not generate any significant changes in the DTF rate.  
We also concluded that the TIB rate relatively closely follows the repo rate.  In this 
section, we will analyse the pass-through between the TIB rate and the DTF rate before 
and after July 2002.  The reason why we use the TIB rate rather than the repo rate, is that 
the repo rate in many aspects is a discrete variable rather than a continuous variable, and 
the econometric technique used here requires the variables to be continuous.   
 
To study the interest-rate pass-through, we will estimate an unrestricted  vector-
autoregressive model (VAR) and study the impulse response functions generated from 























































nm g  are parameters to be estimated, k is the maximum distributed lag length, ? is 
the difference operator and  ent are independent and identically distributed error terms.  
The time series data used for the estimations consists of the overnight TIB rate, tib, and 
the DTF rate, dtf. 
 
The unrestricted VAR defined by equation (2.1) and equation (2.2) is now estimated 
using weekly data from 4 Jan 1999 to 15 Jul 2002 (the first period) as well as from 22 Jul 
2002 to 25 Oct 2004 (the second period).  The maximum lag length, k, is chosen to be 
long enough for the error terms to be normally distributed and not serially correlated.  As 
shown by table 2.1, for the first period, the residual tests for the model are all passed for a 
maximum lag length of 2, with the exception of the kurtosis test, which should not be of 
serious concern.  However, for the second period, none of the normality tests are passed, 
as shown in table 2.2, so the results might in this case be of questionable validity.  The 
residuals are graphed in figure 2.5 and 2.6. 
 
In order to determine the impulse response functions, the variables need to be given a 
plausible ordering.  As discussed earlier, we assume the TIB rate to be exogenous, and 
the DTF rate to be caused by the TIB rate.  A Granger causality test, reported in table 2.3, 
also  suggests that the TIB is a good predictor of the DTF rate in the first period.  
However, for the second period, the null hypothesis that the TIB rate does not Granger 
cause the DTF rate cannot be rejected.  During the second period, the Granger causality, 
in fact, seem to run in the opposite direction, i.e. from the DTF to the TIB. 
   11 
Table 2.1.  Residual tests of the unrestricted VAR 




Test Statistic  P-value 
 
Multivariate Normality 
Joint skewness test  c
2(2) = 0.223  0.894 
Joint kurtosis test  c
2(2) = 483.8  0.000 
     
Autocorrelation 
Portmanteau test  Port(12) = 52.20  0.094 
LM test  LM(12) = 5.21  0.266 
     
Unit Roots 
ADF test residual e1  ADF(13) = -14.47   
ADF test residual e2  ADF(13) = -13.49   
     
 
 
Table 2.2.  Residual tests of the unrestricted VAR 




Test Statistic  P-value 
 
Multivariate Normality 
Joint skewness test  c
2(2) = 281.9  0.000 
Joint kurtosis test  c2(2) = 2,402.1  0.000 
     
Autocorrelation 
Portmanteau test  Port(12) = 28.51  0.912 
LM test  LM(12) = 2.85  0.584 
     
Unit Roots 
ADF test residual e1  ADF(12) = -10.92   
ADF test residual e2  ADF(12) = -10.86   
     
   12 
Figure 2.5.  Residuals of the VAR: First period 
(using data from 4 Jan 1999 to 15 Jul 2002) 
Note: The residuals are e1t and e2t in equation (2.1) and (2.2) respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  Residuals of the VAR: Second period 
(using data from 22 Jul 2002 to 25 Oct 2004) 
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Table 2.3.  Pair-wise Granger causality tests 
 
Time period  Null Hypothesis  No of 
Observations 
F-statistic  P-value 
First period 
(4/1/99-15/7/02) 
TIB does not Granger 
cause DTF 
183  18.80  0.000 
         
  DTF does not 
Granger cause TIB 
183  0.140  0.870 
         
Second period 
(22/7/02-25/10/04) 
TIB does not Granger 
cause DTF 
119  1.045  0.355 
         
  DTF does not 
Granger cause TIB 
119  4.335  0.015 
         
 
 
Table 2.4.  Effects of the DTF rate to a shock in the TIB rate 
 




After 3 weeks  0.10  0.00 
     
After 6 weeks  0.31  0.02 
     
After 12 weeks  0.48  0.02 
     
After 24 weeks  0.34  0.02 
     
 
Note: A pass-through coefficient of 0.10 indicates that a one percent increase in the percentage rate of the 
TIB, e.g. from 5.000 to 5.050 percent, results in a 0.10 percent increase in the percentage rate of the DTF, 
e.g. from 8.000 to 8.008 percent. 
 
   14 
Figure 2.7.  Response of the DTF rate to a shock in the TIB rate: First period 
(using data from 4 Jan 1999 to 15 Jul 2002) 
 
 
Figure 2.8.  Response of the DTF rate to a shock in the TIB rate: Second period 
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Table 2.4 displays the responses of the DTF rate to a one unit shock in the TIB rate.  
Figure 2.7 and 2.8 graphs the impulse-responses.  It is apparent that the DTF rate 
responded significantly to changes in the TIB rate in the first period studied.  After 12 
weeks 48 percent of the change in the TIB has been passed through to the DTF rate.
5 
However, during the second period studied, no significant pass through seem to exist, and 
the DTF rate does not seem to react to changes in the TIB. 
 
 
2.4   The Real Interest Rate: The TIB Has Been Negative 
 
 
During the second half of the 1990s the rate of inflation in Colombia fell continuously, 
and so did interest rates.  In April 2002 the year-on-year inflation rate reached an all time 
low of 5.6 percent, but thereafter it started increasing again, as illustrated in by figure 2.9.  
The decrease in the repo rate, nevertheless, continued throughout April and May, 
resulting in a negative real interest rate for overnight repos.  As discussed previously, the 
overnight inter-bank rate, the TIB, followed the repo rate closely, as illustrated earlier in 
figure 2.3.  In real terms, the TIB was consequently also negative.  This was, in fact, the 
first time real interest rates have been negative since 1998, when inflation targeting 
started. 
 
The banks may have concluded that depositors would not accept a negative real interest 
rate on their deposits.  This could be one explanation to why the banks did not continue 
lowering the DTF further after July 2002, despite the fact that the gap between the TIB 
and the DTF widened from 200 basis points on average during 2001 to 270 basis points 
on average during the second half of 2002. 
                                                  
5 This result is in line with those reported by other studies of interest-rate pass-through.  See, for example, 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003) for a study on Chile and selected European countries.   16 
Figure 2.9.  The repo rate, the DTF rate, and the inflation rate, 2002-2004 (%) 
 
Note: The inflation rate is here defined as the year-on-year change in the consumer price index. 
 




Analysing the real interest rates might,  indeed, suggest that the DTF  rate  was more 
realistic than the TIB or the repo rate during the second half of 2002.  The negative over-
night rates might, actually, have been the main reason for the decoupling of the longer 
interest rates from the TIB.  This would, consequently, suggest that the period with 
negative real short-term rates would be an exception, and that things returned to normal 
after the two 100-basis-point increases in the repo rate, which brought real over-night 
rates back into positive territory.  This reasoning is also supported by the fact that the 
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2.5   The Implicit Forward Rate 
 
Figure 2.10 graphs the 90-to-180-day implicit forward rate6 together with the 90-day 
DTF rate and the 180-day CDT rate.  The implicit forward rate can be interpreted as the 
90-day interest rate expected by the markets in 90 days’ time. 
 
As shown by the figure 2.10, the implicit forward rate is significantly above both the 90-
day and the 180-day interest rates.  If the DTF rate would decrease and the CDT 180 rate 
would remain constant, this would generate an increase in the forward rate. 
 
For the forward rates not to get out of line, the steepness of the yield curve would have to 
increase throughout all maturities in response to the low overnight rates.  However, the 
yield curve is already relatively steep, because the long end of the curve is kept at a high 
level due to the large amounts that the Government borrows at that end of the curve. 
 
Large fiscal deficits have, indeed, led to a rapid increase in the Government debt, as 
illustrated by figure 2.11.  Not only borrowing to finance the budget deficit puts pressure 
on the interest rates, but also the need to roll over maturing debt. 
 
                                                  
6 The 90-to-180-day implicit forward rate, FWD, is calculated as: 
 





















where CDT is the 180-day CDT rate, and DTF is the 90-day DTF rate, which all are expressed in percent.   18 
Figure 2.10.  The DTF rate, the CDT 180 rate, and the implicit 90-to-180-day forward 
rate, 2002-2004 (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República and own calculations 
 
 
Figure 2.11.  General government debt to GDP (%) 
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2.6   The 90-day TES rate 
 
In many countries, an important benchmark rate is the interest rate on Treasury Bills of a 
certain maturity.  It could be envisaged that the 90-day rate paid by Colombian Treasury 
Bills, TES, could become an important benchmark to replace the DTF rate. 
 
The 90-day TES rate is illustrated in figure 2.12.  It is obvious from the figure that during 
2002 the TES rate was significantly below the DTF rate, while since 2003 it has tended to 
remain above.  The reason for the relatively low TES rate during 2002 was that some 
pension funds agreed with the Treasury to buy TES at a reduced rate, so during 2002 the 
TES rate cannot be regarded as a free-market rate.  This practice has now ended. 
 
Another apparent feature of the 90-day TES rate is its high volatility relative to the DTF 
rate.  This suggests that the TES market is relatively immature, and this volatility can be 
expected to fall as the market matures and the agents get better at pricing the bonds. 
 
The 90-day TES rate can be regarded as a free market rate, since it is sold through 
auctions.  It is, nevertheless, a primary market rate rather than a secondary market rate,
7 
and therefore suffers from some shortcomings.  The TES is, for example, sold only to a 
limited number of banks and financial institutions which are then reselling the bonds to 
clients at a margin. 
 
                                                  
7 The primary market rate relates to the rate derived from the price at the original auction of the bonds, 
while the secondary market rate relates to the rate derived from the prices determined by the buyers and 
sellers when the bond is traded.   20 
Figure 2.12.  The repo rate, the DTF rate, and the 90-day TES rate, 2002-2004 (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
 
 
The 90-day TES rate might, furthermore, have reacted to the two 25-basis-point 
decreases in the repo rate in February and March 2004, as indicated by figure 2.12.  
However, due to the large volatility of the TES rate, it is not possible to show this with 
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3   The Banks Might Actively Influence the DTF Rate 
 
The banks might have an incentive to actively influence the DTF rate.  First, the volatility 
of the DTF rate directly influences the cost of risk management.  Second, the DTF rate 
might have a significant influence on the banks’ funding cost.  The cost of risk 
management is discussed in section 3.1, and section 3.2 compares the 90-day DTF rate 
with CD rates of similar maturities.  Section 3.3, compares the 90-day CD rate of banks 
with that of other financial institutions.  Changes in the banks funding cost does, 
however, not seem to explain the behaviour of the DTF rate, which is discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5.   
 
 
3.1   Low Volatility in the DTF Rate Reduces the Cost of Risk Management 
 
To quantify and to control for the risk of the financial system, the main regulatory body 
of the system, the Superintendencia Bancaria, has developed a methodology referred to 
as Value at Risk (VaR).  This is a way to calculate the risk exposure of the financial 
institutions to changes  in  the prices of their financial assets, and to determine the 




The VaR is defined in the following way: 
 










             (3.1) 
 
where ?VPj is the change in the value of position j, DURj is the duration of that position, 
Y is the market yield of the position expressed as the annual effective interest rate, VPj is 
the present value of the position (i.e. the present value of the future cash flows of the 
                                                  
8 This sections builds on the analysis in Hernández (2004)   22 
position), and ?i is the maximum probable variation in the interest rate expressed in 
absolute terms. 
 
The Superintendencia has, furthermore, identified 13 risk factors to which assets, 
liabilities and derivatives are exposed.  The risk of changes in the DTF rate is one of the 




Table 3.1.  Participation of the different risk factors in the Value at Risk, July 2004 
 
  Participation 
in the VaR 
DTF interest rate  16.44% 
Repo interest rate  0.06% 
TIB interest rate  0.02% 
Real interest rate  2.99% 
LIBOR  0.77% 
Interest rate on consumer credit  10.92% 
Money market interest rate  0.07% 
TES interest rate  32.52% 
UVR  15.28% 
USD/COP exchange rate  1.29% 
EUR/COP exchange rate  0.13% 
JPY/COP exchange rate  0.01% 
IGBC  19.48% 
   
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
 
                                                  
9 Only the TES interest rates and the IGBC are more important (the IGBC is the main Colombian stock 
market index).   23 
Figure 3.1: Value at Risk for the DTF risk factor, 2002-2004 
 
Note: Banco Tequendama and Confinanciera are not included. 
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
 
 
The methodology allows for calculating the Value at Risk, VaR, for each of these risk 
factors, f, in the following way: 
 






f f VaR VaR VaR VaR           (3.2) 
 
where the three sums are the sums of the Value at Risk for the asset positions, a, liability 
positions, l, and derivative positions, d, for a single risk factor, f. 
 
When analysing the development of the VaR associated with the risk of changes in the 
DTF rate, it can be observed that the banks have maintained a negative net position in the 
instruments that are affected by changes in the DTF rate, as illustrated by figure 3.1.  An 
increase in this negative net position will lead to an increase in the capital requirements 
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requirements.  The banks might, therefore,  have  an incentive to try to minimise the 
volatility of the DTF rate. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the volatility of the interest rates of CDs with different maturities.  It is 
apparent that the DTF rate shows a low volatility in relation to the interest rates of CDs of 
many  other maturities.  This might suggest that the volatility of the DTF rate is kept 
artificially low.  However, the volume of outstanding 90-day CDs is larger than that of 
any of any other maturities, which will act to bring down the volatility, and 120-day and 
180-day CDs do, in fact, show lower volatility then that of 90-day CDs.  From the data 
presented in this table, we can, therefore, not conclude that the volatility of the DTF rate 
is kept artificially low. 
 
 
Table 3.2.  Volatility of the interest rates of CDs of different maturity 
(July 2002-July 2004) 
 
   
Interest rate volatility 
Part of total volume 
outstanding 
Less than 30 days  0.49  5% 
31-44 days  0.93  3% 
45 days  0.96  0% 
46-59 days  1.15  1% 
60 days  0.52  2% 
61-89 days  0.40  4% 
     
90 days (DTF)  0.26  29% 
     
91-119 days  0.28  15% 
120 days  0.23  6% 
121-179 days  0.29  10% 
180 days  0.23  13% 
181-359 days  0.29  7% 
360 days  0.74  2% 
More than 360 days  0.95  4% 
     
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria, and Hernández (2004)   25 
Another argument against the suggestion that banks have a clear incentive to control the 
DTF rate to lower their capital requirements is that the DTF volatility measure in the VaR 
used to  calculate the capital requirements uses interest rate  data from 1984 up until 
present.  If the banks would actively keep the DTF rate constant since 2002 and onwards, 
this would have a very limited impact on their capital requirements. 
 
In addition, the capital requirements in the banking system have not been a binding 
condition.  On average, the capital requirements are currently around 9 percent of risk 




3.2   The DTF Rate versus CD Rates of Similar Maturities 
 
The DTF rate is calculated as the average interest rate of all 90-day CDs issued during a 
particular week.  CDs of other maturities, e.g. 89 days or 91 days, are not included in the 
DTF composite. 
 
If we compare the 90-day DTF rate with the average interest rate of CDs of 61 to 89 days 
maturity as well as that of CDs of 91 to 119 days maturity, we can conclude that the two 
latter did indeed react to the rises in the repo rate, while the DTF rate remained more or 
less constant.  Figure 3.2 illustrates the development of these three CD rates together with 
the repo rate.  Between mid-July 2002 and mid-January 2003 the average DTF rate was 
7.84 percent.  Between mid-May 2003 and mid-November 2003 the average DTF rate 
was 7.81 percent.  It had consequently fallen 3 basis points.10 Between the same reference 
periods, the average 61-to-89-day CD rate had increased by 4 basis points11 from 7.67 
percent to 7.71 percent, and the average 91-to-119 day CD rate had increased from 8.24 
percent to 8.43 percent, i.e. by 19 basis points.
12 At lease the latter of  these two rates had, 
                                                  
10 This change is not significant at the 10-percent level. 
11 Not significant at the 10-percent level. 
12 Significant at the 1-percent level.   26 
consequently, responded to the two 100-basis-point increases in the repo rate, while the 
DTF rate remained constant.  All three rates did, however, react to the two 25-basis-point 
decreases in the repo rate in 2004.  If we compare a 25-week average just before the first 
decrease with a 25-week average just after the second decrease, the DTF rate fell by 8 
basis points, the 61-to-89-day CD rate fell by 25 basis points and the 91-to-119-day CD 




Figure 3.2: The repo rate, the DTF rate, the 61-89 day CD rate, and the 91-119 day CD 
rate (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
 
 
One strategy that could be used by the banks to control the 90-day DTF rate is to offer 
90-day CDs at a constant rate of interest to smaller clients while offering CDs of other 
maturities at more attractive rates to larger clients.  The rationale behind this strategy 
would be that smaller clients normally have only one bank and faces a significant 
switching cost if considering changing to another bank.  Larger clients, on the other hand, 
                                                  
13 All these changes are significant at the 5-percent level.  In the case of the DTF rate and the 91-to-119-day 
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normally have several banks and can, therefore, chose the bank that offers the best rate.  
Data to support or reject this theory is not readily available.  However, even if the banks 
did not actively use this strategy, they would be assumed to offer 90-day standardised 
CDs to both small and large clients, while offering tailor made CDs of other maturities 
exclusively to large clients.  So even if this strategy is actively used, it would be almost 
impossibly to find quantitative evidence that this is the case. 
 
 
3.3   The 90-day CD Rates of Banks and of Other Financial Institutions 
 
Figure 3.3 compares the 90-day CD rate of banks with that of financial  corporations 
(FCs) and that of companies for commercial financing (CCFs).
14 It is obvious from the 
figure that the CD rate of the banks is much more stable than those of the other financial 
institutions. 
 
The average weekly change in the 90-day CD rate of banks between July 2002 and July 
2004 was 6 basis points, while the corresponding figures for financial corporations and 
companies for commercial financing was 13 and 12 basis points respectively.  This could, 
nevertheless, be expected, since the volume of CDs issued by banks is much larger than 
that of the other institutions.  Banks do, indeed, issue 81 percent of all 90-day CDs, while 
FCs issue 12 percent and CCFs issue only 7 percent.
15 
 
                                                  
14 In Colombia those are referred to as  corporaciones financieras and compañías de financiamiento 
comercial. 
15 Hernández (2004), p.  2.   28 
Figure 3.3: The 90-day CD rates for banks and other financial institutions (%) 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
 
 
However, there is a stronger relationship between the weekly  overnight TIB and the 
weekly  90-day CD rates of financial corporations and companies for commercial 
financing than between the TIB and the 90-day CD rate of banks.
16 The correlation 
coefficient between the TIB and the 90-day CD rate of banks was actually negative at        
-0.02 for the period July 2002 to July 2004 while the correlation coefficient between the 
TIB and the 90-day CD rates of FCs and CCFs was 0.61 and 0.34 respectively. 
 
The 90-day CD rates of financial corporations and of companies of commercial financing 
also seem to have reacted to the two 100-basis-point increases in the repo rate in January 
and May 2003.  If we look at the two 26-week periods from 26 July 2002 to 17 January 
2003 (first period) and 23 May 2003 to 17 November 2003 (second period), i.e. the same 
periods as we studied in the previous section, we can show that the 90-day CD rate of 
banks fell from an average of 7.66 percent in the first period to an average of 7.64 percent 
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in the second period, i.e. by 2 basis points.17 If we analyse the corresponding rate for FCs, 
this  increased by 19 basis points18 from 8.27 percent to 8.46 percent, and for CCFs the 
rate increased by 7 basis points
19 from 8.96 percent to 9.03 percent. 
 
 
3.4   The Reduced Spread Cannot Be Explained by Changes in the Banks’ Funding 
 
As discussed earlier, the repo rate was increased by 100 basis points in January 2003 and 
by a further 100 basis points in May that same year.  The DTF rate did not react to any of 
these rate hikes.  This implied that the spread between the two interest rates decreased by 
200 basis points from around 250 basis points in the beginning of 2003 to approximately 
50 basis points five months later. 
 
One possible explanation could be that the banks funding cost had changed due to a 
reallocation in their  liabilities, from CDs to  shorter term  liabilities, and that the 
importance of CDs as a source of financing had decreased.  In such a case, inter-bank 
credit and repos should have increased significantly as part of the banks liabilities, while 
CDs should have decreased. 
 
To investigate whether this has been the case, we start by looking at the composition of 
the banks’ liabilities, which is illustrated by figure 3.4.  We can see that CDs were the 
largest liability class, accounting for 26.4 percent of total assets, followed by savings 
accounts, accounting for some 25.5 percent.  Bank credit, of which a part is overnight 
credit, accounted for some 6.5 percent, and repos accounted for some 5.2 percent.  The 
volume of bank credit and repos is, consequently, small in comparison to CDs. 
 
                                                  
17 This change is not significant at the 15-percent level. 
18 Significant at the 1-percent level. 
19 Significant only at the 15-percent level.   30 
Figure 3.4: The composition of the assets of the banks, August 2003 
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Changes in the composition of the assets of the banks, 
August 2002 – August 2003 
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Now we continue to study the changes in the composition of the banks’ liabilities 
between August 2002 and August 2003.  During this period the repo rate as well as the 
TIB  increased by some 200 basis points while the DTF rate remained more or less 
constant.  We have chosen to look at the changes over a full one-year period (i.e. August 
2002 to August 2003) to avoid interference of seasonal changes in the liabilities.  Figure 
3.5 illustrates the changes in the different classes of liabilities.  The volume of CDs, 
indeed, fell by 1.1 percentage points, while the volume of repos increased by the same 
amount.  However, this change is too small to fully explain the large fall in the spread 
between the DTF rate and the repo rate.  The other apparent change in the graph, the fact 
that investment titles fell by some 2.7 percentage points, and other liabilities increased 
with a similar amount, relates to a reclassification of a large account in one financial 
institution, Fogafin, so this did not account for any real change. 
 
Repos are issued both by Banco de la República and by the Tesoreria, the Treasury.  The 
increase in repos observed earlier in figure 3.5 can, therefore be broken down in these 
two types of repos.  As illustrated in figure 3.5 by the first two sets of bars, the increase in 
the banks’ holdings of repos is explained by a significant increase in the volume of repos 
of the Treasury.  However, only 20 banks deal with the T reasury, so  we continue by 
dividing the banks into those dealing with the Treasury and those not dealing with the 
Treasury.  If studying the banks dealing with the Treasury, it is apparent that their 
holdings of Treasury repos increased sharply, as expected.  However, their holdings of 
repos with Banco de la República did not fall sharply.  The banks not dealing with the 
treasury did, however, only increase their repo holdings marginally. 
   32 
Figure 3.6: Changes in the banks’ holdings of repos, August 2002 – August 2003 
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Changes in the volume of CDs in the banking system, 
August 2002 – August 2003 
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If we study the volume of CDs issued by the banks, this has decreased by 1.1 percentage 
points between August 2002 and August 2003, as discussed earlier.  In figure 3.6, the 
volume of CDs has been broken down by maturity (CDs with a maturity of less than 6 
months and CDs of longer maturities) as well as by banks that deal with the Treasury and 
those that do not.  It is apparent from the figure that the total volume of short-term CDs 
decreased, which was also the case of longer term CDs.  This pattern was only broken by 
banks not dealing with the treasury, which saw a slight increase i n their volume of 
outstanding longer-term CDs. 
 
We can consequently conclude that there was a change in the composition in the banks’ 
liabilities between August 2002 and August 2003, but that these changes were relatively 
small.  In particular, the changes were not large enough to explain the large fall in the 
spread between the overnight repo and inter-bank rates, and the DTF rate. 
 
In a recent survey20 made by the Superintendencia Bancaria, a number of banks have, 
nevertheless, stated that they have to some extent switched their emphasis from CDs to 
repos as a source of liquidity.  This is due to the generous supply of liquidity from Banco 
de la República as well as from the Treasury.  So this might, all the same, offer part of the 
explanation to why the DTF rate did not react to the increases in the repo rate, even if this 
is not clearly apparent in the data analysed in this section. 
 
                                                  
20 Not published.   34 
 
3.5   The Overnight Rates Have Only Limited Impact on the Banks’ Funding Cost 
 
In  figure 3.4 in the previous section, we observed that repos accounted for some 5.2 
percent of total liabilities in the banking system, and bank credit, of which some is 
overnight credit, accounted for some 6.5 percent.  Even if their shares of the total 
liabilities of the banking system are not n egligible, a change in the overnight rate has 
relatively limited impact on the banks’ funding cost. 
 
The transmission mechanism between the overnight rate and the 90-day DTF rate does, 
consequently, not work through the banks’ funding cost, but rather through other 
mechanisms, such as arbitrage. 
   35 
4   Other Factors that Make the DTF Rate Sticky 
 
The DTF rate might, in fact, remain constant because it is sticky by its nature rather than 
because it is actively controlled by some market players.  If the DTF rate is sticky, it 
might, indeed, remain constant only to change when it is significantly out of line with 
what it should be.  In this chapter we will briefly discuss a number of factors that might 
make the DTF rate sticky.  The low competition in the financial system is discussed in 
section 4.1; the fact that the DTF rate is not a free-market rate is discussed in section 4.2; 
the nature of the DTF rate as a very dominant benchmark is discussed in section 4.3; and, 
finally, the arbitrage mechanism between the DTF rate and other interest rates is 
examined in section 4.4. 
 
 
4.1   Competition in the Financial System Is Very Low 
 
Competition within the financial system in Colombia is very low.  This is not so much 
because the system is an oligopoly.  Colombia has  over 80 banks and financial 
institutions present, as illustrated by figure 4.1. 
 
The reason for the low competition is rather that switching costs are high for the clients, 
with the exception of the largest clients that normally deal with several banks.  The cause 
of the high switching cost is the problem of information present in any banking system.  
When a client has built up a relationship with his bank and proven that he is a good 
customer in the sense that he is able and willing to service his debt promptly, the bank 
will generally be able to o ffer him credit lines and loans at better terms.  The bank’s 
ability to assess a client’s creditworthiness, therefore, increases over time.  If the client 
decides to change banks, he will have to start all over again, and the process to build up a 
relationship with the new bank is normally both costly and time consuming.  For this 
reason, most clients stay with their bank for a long time, and are reluctant to change to 
another bank, even if this would be significantly better.   36 
Figure 4.1: Total assets of individual banks, August 2003 (COP billions) 
 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
 
 
There is, nevertheless, some concentration in the Colombian financial sector.  If studying 
the market for CDs, we can conclude that eight financial institutions are issuing more 
than 50 percent of all CDs.
21 This concentration is also apparent in figure 4.1, which 
graphs the total assets of the individual banks in the system. 
 
The main explanation to the low competition in the CD market is, nevertheless, that very 
few clients choose to shop around, but instead prefer to invest the money with their 
traditional bank.  Market concentration in itself is less of a problem. 
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4.2   The DTF Rate Is Not a Free Market Rate 
 
The DTF rate is not an auction based free-market rate, but rather a rate that banks and 
financial institutions offer to their clients on 90-day Certificates of Deposits, i.e. a certain 
type of time deposits.  To change this CD rate requires an explicit decision from the bank.  
Under such conditions, the DTF rate does not necessarily react to smaller changes in 
demand and supply conditions in the market, even if it will have to be adjusted if market 
conditions change significantly.  An auction rate, on the other hand, does not suffer from 
this kind of shortcomings. 
 
Most developed countries, such as the United States, use a free-market rate as a 
benchmark rate.  In the case of the U.S., the most important benchmark is probably the 
one-year Treasury Bill rate, which is determined in the secondary market of traded T-
Bills with a time to maturity of one year.  This rate is published regularly. 
 
The DTF rate will, by its very nature, be more sticky than a rate determined by a traded 
market.  An auction-based rate is another type of free market rate.  The 90-day TES could 
in this aspect act as a better benchmark than the DTF rate.  However, the 90-day TES rate 
suffers from other shortcomings.  The relatively small volumes issued of 90-day TES 
have lead to a large volatility of this rate, as illustrated earlier in figure 2.12.  The 
volumes issued have, nevertheless, recently been increased, and the total outstanding 
volume of 90-day TES is today around half of that of outstanding 90-day CDs.  The TES 
rate does, however, suffer from another shortcoming.  As a primary market rate, it is 
influenced by the fact that many of the players buy TES just to sell them on to their 
clients for a profit.  A secondary market rate that does not suffer from this bias is 
normally better as a benchmark.  The secondary market for TES is, however, far from 
liquid enough to act as a source for a benchmark.   38 
 
4.3   The DTF Is a Dominant Benchmark 
 
The DTF rate is, indeed, by far the most important benchmark rate in Colombia.  As such 
an important benchmark, other rates tend to follow it.  As we discussed in section 3.2 
earlier, both the 61-to-89-day CD rate and the 91-to-119-day CD rate reacted to the 200-
basis-point increase in the repo rate, while the DTF rate remained constant.  However, the 
increase in these two rates were only 13 and 23 basis points respectively, and these 
increases could, indeed, have been expected to be larger.  However, the influence that the 
DTF rate has as a benchmark on the other interest rates of similar maturities should be 
significant, and this is probably the main explanation to why we did not see a larger 
increase. 
 
There is no other important benchmark rate in the short end (less than one year) of the 
Colombian yield curve.  For this reason, the markets have a problem to correctly price 
short-term fixed-income assets.  Even if the DTF rate is out of line, nobody really knows 
what the 90-day rate should be.  Many players in the market, therefore, continue to price 
assets out of the DTF rate, even if this might be misleading.  Therefore, if the DTF rate 
does not react to an increase in the repo rate, no other short-term rate will react 
significantly either. 
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4.4   Arbitrage with Other Interest Rates Too Expensive 
 
Generally, a change in the short-term interest rate, such as the overnight rate, should 
induce changes in the longer-term interest rates, since such a change should generate a 
change in interest-rate expectations.  The longer-term interest rates, it+n, should, indeed, 
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where t is the present time, n is the time to maturity of the interest rate, it+n, and 1, 2, …, 
n-1 are the times to maturity of the shorter interest rates.  An  e indicates an expected 
interest rate.  This relationship generates a smooth yield curve that under normal 
circumstances has a positive slope.
23 That this relationship holds is guaranteed by 
arbitrage. 
 
However, the 0.4 percent transaction tax24 present in Colombia simply hinders arbitrage 
at the short end of the yield curve.  For a bank or another financial institution to fund 
itself with 90-day  CDs and to reinvest those titles is not viable, since the transaction tax 
in annual terms will take 1.6 percentage points off the yield.  The transactions tax has, 
therefore, effectively stopped all arbitrage at the short end of the curve.
25 
                                                  
22 See also Hernández (2004). 
23 A yield curve can under some circumstances have a negative slope, and is then referred to as being 
inverted.  However, a discussion on this is outside the scope of this paper.  See, for example, Fabozzi 
(2001) for a discussion on yield curves and their properties. 
24 Referred to as the cuatro por mil. 
25 See also Reveis (2002a).   40 
5   Conclusion 
 
Since mid-July 2002, the 90-day DTF interest rate has remained more or less constant at 
around 7.8 percent.  Most importantly, it did not react to two 100-basis-point increases in 
the overnight repo rate in January and May 2003.  This is highly unsatisfactory, since it 
has rendered the repo rate as an important monetary policy tool rather inefficient. 
 
This paper has studied the DTF rate and its development over time, and it has provided a 
number of explanations to why the DTF rate has stayed constant since July 2002.  The 
paper has also shown that the pass-through from the overnight rate to DTF rate, that was 
present before July 2002, has completely vanished.  Before July 2002 a change in the 
overnight inter-bank rate (TIB) was partially passed through to the DTF rate with a pass-
through coefficient reaching 0.48 after 12 weeks.  After July 2002 this coefficient only 
reached 0.02 after 12 weeks. 
 
The paper has provided a number of explanations to why the DTF rate has remained 
constant: 
 
•  The real overnight interest rates have been negative.  In June 2003, the repo rate 
was lowered to 4.25 percent, with the overnight inter-bank rate promptly 
following suit.  With inflation running at around 7 percent, this resulted in clearly 
negative interest rates.  The overnight rates at this time seem to have been much 
more out of the market than the DTF rate.  Only with the two large 100-basis-
point increases in the repo rate in January and  May 2003 the real overnight 
interest rates were brought into positive territory again.  In this sense, the two 
100-basis-point increases might have been exceptions, and the breakdown of the 
transfer mechanism between the over-night rates and the longer rates might, in 
fact, have been temporary. 
 
•  The implicit forward rates have been high.  Between October 2003 and 
September 2004 the average DTF rate was 7.83 percent, the average 180-day CD 
rate was 8.49 percent, which yielded an average 90-to-180-day implicit forward 
rate of 8.97 percent.  A fall in the DTF rate without a corresponding fall in the 
180-day CD rate would imply a rise in the forward rate, which would be 
unrealistic.  A fall in the longer rates of the yield curve might not be plausible 
since this end of the curve is held up by large amounts of government borrowing.   41 
 
•  That the banks would actively keep the DTF rate constant is not a plausible 
assumption.  We have shown that the volatility of the DTF rate influences the 
level of the minimum capital requirements that banks must fulfil.  A low volatility 
of the DTF rate reduces such capital requirements, and this might give the banks 
an incentive to try to reduce this volatility.  We have shown that even if the DTF 
rate did not react to the two 100-basis-point increases in the repo rate, CD rates of 
similar maturities (i.e. maturities between 61 and 89 days as well as maturities 
between 91 and 119 days) did, indeed, react to these changes.  However, the 
volatility measure used to calculate the banks’ capital requirements is based on 
the DTF rate from 1984 up until present, so keeping the DTF rate constant for the 
last two years or so would only have a very limited impact on the capital 
requirements.  The capital requirements have, furthermore, not been a binding 
condition in the banking system.  This is, therefore, not a plausible explanation to 
the recent behaviour of the DTF rate. 
 
•  Competition in the financial system is low.  We have discussed the fact that 
competitions in the financial system is low not because it is an oligopoly – there 
are in fact over 80 banks and other financial institutions present in Colombia – but 
because switching costs are high.  Low competition tend to take the pressure off 
the agents to actively and constantly adjust their prices, and prices in such a 
system will, therefore, tend to be more sticky. 
 
•  The DTF rate is not a free market rate.  The DTF rate is not an auction-based 
free-market rate, but rather a deposit rate offered by banks to their clients on their 
90-day CDs.  To change this rate normally requires an explicit decision from the 
bank, and the rate does, therefore, not necessarily react to smaller changes in 
market conditions. 
 
•  The DTF rate is a dominant benchmark.  The DTF rate is by far the most 
important benchmark rate in Colombia, and as such other interest rates tend to 
follow it.  Even if CD rates of similar maturities to the DTF rate reacted to the 
rises in the repo rate, these reactions were relatively modest (the reaction of the 
rates of CDs of a maturity of between 61 and 89 days to the two 100-basis-point 
increases in the repo rate was only 13 basis points, and that of CDs of a maturity 
between 91 and 119 days was only 23 basis points). 
 
•  Banks’ funding cost has not influenced the DTF rate.  We have shown that the 
structure of the banks’ liabilities did not change significantly during the 12-month 
period (August 2002 to August 2003), which included the two 100-basis-point 
increases in the repo rate.  Banks do, nevertheless, claim that they rely less on 
CDs as a source of funding due to the generous supply of liquidity in the form of 
overnight repos from Banco de la República as well as from the Treasury, so this 
might still offer a part of the explanation to why the DTF rate did not react to the 
hikes in the repo rate. 
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The low competition in the financial system, the fact that the DTF rate is no a free-market 
rate and that it is a dominant benchmark are nothing new.  These structural characteristics 
were present long before the significant change in the behaviour of the DTF rate in mid-
2002.  However, the economic environment is very different today from some years ago.  
Colombia is today experiencing a low-inflation environment with low nominal interest 
rates.  From 1998 to 2003, consumer-price inflation fell from 19.4 percent to 7.1 percent, 
and interest rates followed suit, with the DTF rate falling from 32.6 percent to 7.8 
percent.  While the inherent stickiness of the DTF rate did not matter much before when 
interest rates were high and very volatile, it has come to play a much more important part 
since mid-2002, in the current low-inflation environment. 
 
A question is then what Colombia should do about the situation.  In the long run, the 
Country should aim to define another benchmark.  This should ideally be based on 
secondary market prices of traded TES at a certain maturity (e.g. 90 days or 1 year).  This 
does, however, require an active creation of such a market and a commitment by the 
Government to issue enough TES at this maturity to keep the market liquid.   43 
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